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PROHIBITION: THE ELUSIVE AND MISUNDERSTOOD WRIT
To many legal practitioners the writ of prohibition remains an enigma.
Seldom used and even less often understood,1 this extraordinary remedy
at law2 has long been recognized in Virginia as a tool with which to re-
strain an offending court from unwarranted conduct.3 Used properly, the
writ will encourage the due and regular administration of justice by con-
fining each tribunal to the exercise of those powers with which it has been
entrusted under the constitution and laws of the state.4 The writ has been
defined by the Virginia Supreme Court as "a proceeding between two
courts-a superior and an inferior-and is the means whereby the supe-
rior exercises its due superintendence over the inferior, and keeps it
within the limits and bounds of the jurisdiction prescribed to it by law."'
Common law provided 6 for this extraordinary remedy7 and most states,
including Virginia, have expressly granted their high courts jurisdiction
over proceedings in prohibition.8
Despite this universal acceptance, the writ remains shrouded in confu-
sion.9 This comment will examine the writ of prohibition as it has been
applied in Virginia. The goal is to dispel some of the confusion surround-
ing its use and to highlight some of the issues regarding its nature and
1. "There is no legal remedy, no common law writ, of which so much that is erroneous has
been written, in text books and in certain classes of judicial decisions in America, as that of
the remedy by writ of prohibition." Wehe & Belcher, Prohibition in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L.
Rav. 546, 546 (1941) (quoting Cooper, The Remedy by Prohibition in Florida as Affected by
Some Recent Supreme Court Cases, 2 FLA. ST. B.A.L.J. 6, 11 (1928)).
2. Like all other extraordinary remedies (certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, proce-
dendo and quo warranto), prohibition is to be resorted to only in cases where the usual and
ordinary forms of remedy are insufficient to afford redress. J. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES 555 (1874); see notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text.
3. The earliest English accounts of the exercise of the writ come from the twelfth century.
Hughes & Brown, The Writ of Prohibition, 26 GEo. L.J. 831, 832 (1938) (citing RoGERS,
EccLEsIAsTicAL LAw 776 (2d ed. 1849)). In Virginia, as in most states, the writ was adopted
as a part of its common law heritage from England and was recognized by the Virginia
Constitution. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
4. J. HIGH, supra note 2, at 550 (citing Quimbo Appo v. People, 20 N.Y. 533 (1860)).
5. Mayo v. James, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 17, 23 (1855).
6. Prohibition is surmised to be as old as the common law itself. J. HIGH, supra note 2, at
551. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
7. Although the writ is often called a remedy, such terminology may be misleading as its
function is preventive rather than remedial. See notes 70-76 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10; FLA. CONsT. art. 5, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 4(a); LA.
CoNsT. art. 7, § 2; NaV. CONsT. art. 6, § 4; N.M. CONsT. art. 6, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 2;
OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; Tax. CONsT. art. 5, § 3; VT. CONsT. art. 4, § 2; VA. CONST. art. VI, §
1; W. VA. CONsT. art. 8, § 3. In addition, the Virginia statutes set out general provisions
governing the writ. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-644 to -652 (RepL VoL 1977).
9. Comment, The Writ of Prohibition in Pennsylvania, 80 DICK. L. REv. 472, 473 (1976).
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scope.
I. HISTORY
The writ of prohibition originated in England 0 as the King's preroga-
tive writ, one which the crown had the exclusive right to issue.11 The
power to issue the writ was placed in the court known as the Aula Regis,
the first known Supreme Court of England, over which the King person-
ally presided.22 The original and primary purpose of the writ of prohibi-
tion in England was to guard the jurisdiction of the King's court against
the encroachment of other courts." The earliest references to the writ of
prohibition are from the twelfth century and reveal that the writ was em-
ployed by the King's court to limit the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic
courts."4
In the thirteenth century, the legal system of England was still in its
infancy and suffered from lack of organization. Isolated courts with indef-
inite jurisdictions abounded. Each of these courts competed for greater
prestige and judicial fees. 15 Of these struggles, the most bitter arose be-
tween the King's tribunals and the ecclesiastical courts'6 in the battle be-
tween church and state. As a result, the use of the writ had a political
rather than a judicial emphasis.17
After most of the political infighting between the courts subsided, the
writ became primarily a judicial instrument. 8 Greater emphasis was
placed upon the interests of the individual litigants and less upon re-
straining invasion upon the regal dignity.'9 This change in emphasis gen-
10. For a comprehensive review of the development of the English writ, see Hughes &
Brown, supra note 3; Wolfram, The "Ancient and Just" Writ of Prohibition in New York,
52 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1952).
11. Note, Writs of Prohibition, 36 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1923).
12. Hughes & Brown, supra note 3, at 834.
13. The prevailing maxim of the day was that "every good judge should enlarge his juris-
diction." Id. at 832. Yet, the courts following the maxim ran afoul of the prerogative writ.
14. The references are from Lord Glanville's treatise on the laws and customs of England
written around 1181. Wolfram, supra note 10, at 344 n.2.
15. Note, supra note 11, at 863.
16. The ecclesiastical courts were created by decree of William the Conqueror to have
jurisdiction over all religi us matters. 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW 88 (2d ed. 1968)
17. "Emphasis [was] being placed at this time strongly upon the enforcement of the
King's prerogative." Note, supra note 11, at 863.
18. Id. at 864. This attitude continued and in the eighteenth century, in the interest of
justice, the power to issue the writ was extended to the English Courts of Chancery, Com-
mon Pleas and Exchequer. 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63 (3d
ed. Cooley 1884).
19. In Virginia, the writ "has always.., been regarded as an existing legal remedy." 53
Va. (12 Gratt.) at 18. See Jackson v. Maxwell, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 636 (1826); Hutson v. Lowry,
3 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 42 (1816); Millar v. Marshall, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 158 (1808). Presumably
the writ would continue to exist in Virginia as a matter of common law apart from statute.
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erated a more favorable climate for adoption of the writ in America.
In Virginia the writ was adopted as a part of the state's common law
heritage from England.20 In addition, the Constitution of Virginia recog-
nized the writ and granted original jurisdiction to the supreme court in
matters of prohibition.21 Despite this early historical recognition, it was
not until 1855 that the Virginia Supreme Court first reported a case in-
volving the writ of prohibition. In that case, Mayo v. James,22 the su-
preme court held the writ inapplicable against a mayor who, having am-
ple power to take cognizance of cases involving a violation of any city
ordinance or by-law, was not in excess of his granted jurisdiction. Since
that time the writ has been utilized infrequently, 23 yet the writ remains,
as the following discussion will show, a viable instrument for challenging
a court's authority to hear a particular case.2
II. NATURE OF THE WRIT
A. Context in Which a Petition for Writ May Arise
The writ of prohibition, like a mandamus decree,25 is a direct order
issued from a superior court to an inferior court to restrain the lower
court from activity beyond its granted jurisdiction."6 The various courts
in Virginia have each been granted jurisdiction, the power to hear and
determine a case, that is in some way limited. The traditional bases for
testing jurisdiction are threefold: first, the court must have jurisdiction
over the parties involved;27 second, the subject matter which is being ad-
20. There was a recognition that justice required that the writ be used not only to protect
the interest of the sovereign but also to restrain an encroachment upon the rights of his
subjects. Hughes & Brown, supra note 3, at 841. The American courts, naturally, empha-
sized the petitioner's right against injury through unauthorized exercise of judicial power.
Board of Supervisors v. Bazile, 195 Va. 739, 80 S.E.2d 566 (1954) (writ issued where damage
or injustice is likely to follow).
21. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 1 (original but not exclusive jurisdiction). See Supervisors of
Bedford v. Wingfield, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 329, 333 (1876).
22. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 17. Note that there were earlier cases reported from lower courts.
See, e.g., Hutson v. Lowry, 3 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 42 (1816); Millar v. Marshall, 3 Va. (1 Va.
Cas.) 158 (1808).
23. The Virginia Supreme Court made a somewhat prophetic statement in 1855 when it
said "[t]he writ of prohibition has not very often been resorted to in this state .... 53 Va.
(12 Gratt.) at 18.
24. See, e.g., In re Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 222 Va. 454, 281 S.E.2d 857 (1981) (most
recent Virginia decision involving writ of prohibition).
25. In the most basic sense, mandamus commands action by inferior bodies whereas pro-
hibition restrains the same. For a comparison of prohibition with mandamus, see Comment,
supra note 9, at 485-87.
26. In Virginia the courts with authority to issue the writ of prohibition are: a) the su-
preme court, VA. CODE ANN. § 17-96 (Repl. Vol. 1975); and b) the circuit courts, Id. § 8.01-
261 (Cur. Supp. 1981).
27. Id. §§ 8.01-328 to -330 (Cur. Supp. 1981).
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judicated must be one of which the particular court has been given cogni-
zance;2 ' and, third, the amount of recovery being sought in the particular
action must not exceed limitations placed upon that level of the courts.29
All of these limitations upon jurisdiction are founded upon the desire to
maintain order and regularity in the system of courts.
The proceeding in prohibition is not a part or continuation of the pro-
hibited proceeding as is true in the cases of the interlocutory appeal or
appeal of a final judgment. Rather, the prohibition proceeding is wholly
secondary or collateral to the proceeding in question in the sense that
none of the substantive issues of that case are addressed. Thus, although
the writ appears to be appellate in nature, it cannot be accurately de-
scribed as such.30 The prohibition petition is related to the prohibited
proceeding only to the extent that, if successful, it will arrest that pro-
ceeding and prevent its being further prosecuted.31 To the extent that the
two proceedings are distinct and the prohibition action presents a ques-
tion separate from the substance of the trial court action, the writ is, in
form, original.32
B. Conflicting Views of the Writ: A Matter of Discretion or of Right?
A recognized debate exists as to whether the writ issues as a matter of
right or whether its issuance is governed solely by judicial discretion."
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently described the writ as one of
sound judicial discretion to be granted or withheld according to the cir-
cumstances of each particular case.34 Although the court has not ex-
pressed a rationale for this stand, it stated in Supervisors of Bedford v.
28. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-96, -97 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (set-
ting out subject matter jurisdiction for supreme court).
29. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (establishing $1,000 maximum
amount in controversy for exclusive jurisdiction of general district courts).
30. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) at 23. "[T]he remedy by prohibition is distinct from and indepen-
dent of, though collateral to, the proceeding sought to be prohibited." Id. at 25. Accord,
Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104 (1889). If, in fact, there is a final judgment then the
writ will not issue. See notes 74, 75 infra and accompanying text.
31. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) at 23.
32. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Virginia is termed original. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 1; R. Sup. CT. VA. 5:5. However, one must be aware that in some cases of prohibition
the jurisdiction is not original in the sense that it deals with matters never yet adjudicated.
This is so because in many states there is a requirement that the issue of lack of jurisdiction
be presented to the trial court prior to any petition for a writ.
33. Wehie & Belcher, supra note 1, at 548-49; Comment, supra note 9, at 493-94. For an
example of a state which views the writ as one of right, see W. VA. CODE § 53-1-1 (Repl. VoL
1981).
34. King v. Hening, 203 Va. 582, 125 S.E.2d 827 (1962); Board of Supervisors v. Bazile,
195 Va. 739, 80 S.E.2d 566 (1954); Supervisors of Bedford v. Wingfield, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.)
329 (1876). It is notable that these cases advocate the rule of discretion to the express exclu-
sion of the rule of right.
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Wingfield 5 that prohibition, as a prerogative writ, is to be used with
"great caution and forebearance."' s This view may reflect an attitude of
deference toward judges in the inferior courts allowing them the opportu-
nity to make judgments as to their own jurisdiction.37 On the other hand,
those states which describe the writ as one of right stress that liberal use
of prohibition will encourage regularity in judicial proceedings by
preventing unauthorized encroachment of jurisdiction by inferior courts."
This goal is not, however, unique to those states. In the Wingfield case,
the Virginia Supreme Court also recognized that the writ is used "to se-
cure order and regularity in judicial proceedings." ' 9
The conclusion is, then, that the label of right or discretion is not de-
terminative of when the writ will be granted or denied. Under either prin-
ciple, the ultimate question is whether the inferior court has jurisdiction
over the disputed matter.40 However, one can find a difference in the dis-
position of cases involving the writ, depending upon the view of the de-
vice. For example, in a state where the writ of prohibition is considered a
matter of right, the writ will issue regardless of the existence of other
effective remedies such as a writ of error.' 1 In Virginia and other jurisdic-
tions which view the writ as discretionary, the existence of an alternative
remedy is always sufficient reason for denying the writ.42
Beyond the questions relating to the context in which the writ of prohi-
bition arises and its right or discretionary nature, one must consider what
the Virginia courts have recognized as a lack of jurisdiction. This consid-
eration and others which affect or condition the issuance of the writ are
addressed in the following section.
I1. SCOPE OF THE WRIT
A. Threshold: Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction
As noted above, the determinative question in a prohibition proceeding
is whether the inferior court is empowered to hear the controversy. Thus,
35. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 329 (1876).
36. Id. at 333.
37. The Virginia Supreme Court called it a matter of judicial courtesy to a lower court.
King v. Hening, 208 Va. 582, 125 S.E.2d 827 (1962).
38. Comment, supra note 9, at 494.
39. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 333.
40. Note that in some other states, e.g., Pennsylvania and West Virginia, abuse of power
is an additional ground for granting the writ. Arguably, a Virginia case holds similarly. See
note 51 infra and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S.E. 196
(1898).
42. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 329. In Florida, a state which has adopted the "sound judicial
discretion" approach, the writ is one of right where the court lacks jurisdiction and the
petitioner, faced with injury, lacks another adequate remedy. Wehle & Belcher, supra note
1, at 546. None of the Virginia decisions has adopted this approach.
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the major ground for relief is want or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court.48 Most of the prohibition cases dealt with by the Virginia
Supreme Court have been based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.44
There are no reported Virginia cases where the writ has been granted
based on lack of personal jurisdiction, 45 but in at least one case the writ
was issued where the amount in controversy limitation was violated.46 In
any case, if the "court or judge has jurisdiction to enter any order in the
proceeding sought to be prohibited, the writ does not lie." 47
In other jurisdictions as well, lack or excess of jurisdiction has been
widely accepted as the primary ground for relief by the writ of prohibi-
tion.48 One writer points to this narrow basis of application as the chief
reason why the writ has been so seldom used and why the writ is not
likely to expand to restrain other abuses of the courts.49 Historically, an-
other closely related ground for relief by prohibition arose where a court,
having jurisdiction originally, exceeded that jurisdiction in the hearing of
a case.50 Several early Virginia cases utilized this rationale in holding that
the writ can be issued against a court which attempts "to proceed by
rules differing from those which ought to have been observed." 51 Recent
43. Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 139 S.E.2d 114 (1964).
44. See, e.g., In re Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 222 Va. 454, 281 S.E.2d 857 (1981)
(where statutory period for modification, vacation or suspension by trial court has passed,
writ will issue to prevent action by judge of trial court); Lee v. Jones, 212 Va. 792, 188
S.E.2d 102 (1972) (criminal court has no subject matter jurisdiction over child under 15
years of age); County School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956) (circuit court,
being a court of general jurisdiction had jurisdiction of subject matter of mandamus ac-
tion-prohibition will not lie); Burroughs v. Taylor, 90 Va. 55, 17 S.E. 745 (1893) (justice of
peace lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant new trial when more than 30 days have
elapsed since judgment-prohibition will lie); Mayo v. James, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 17 (1855)
(mayor has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving violation of city ordi-
nances-prohibition will not lie).
45. Prohibition is generally said to lie only to challenge subject matter rather than per-
sonal jurisdiction. However, this rule is not without exceptions. Boyer & Barton, Writ of
Prohibition in Florida Since 1951, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 241, 247 (1977).
46. James v. Stokes, 77 Va. 225 (1883). In this case the judge, under pretext of acquies-
cence, attempted to exert jurisdiction over a case which involved a recovery in excess of the
amount in controversy limitation. The supreme court held that he could not split the action
into three separate portions to circumvent the limitation.
47. Grief v. Kegley, 115 Va. 552, 557, 79 S.E. 1063, 1064 (1913). See also County School
Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Beale, 102 Va.
295, 46 S.E. 307 (1904).
48. Boyer & Barton, supra note 45, at 241.
49. Id. at 249.
50. Hughes & Brown, supra note 3, at 837.
51. Nelms v. Vaughan, 84 Va. 696, 698, 5 S.E. 704, 705 (1888). See also Shell v. Cousins,
77 Va. 328 (1883); James v. Stokes, 77 Va. 225 (1883); Hogan v. Guigon, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.)
705 (1878); McDougal v. Guigon, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 133 (1876); Ex parte Ellyson, 61 Va. (20
Gratt.) 10 (1870); West v. Ferguson, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 270 (1861). The Pennsylvania courts
have more recently applied this rationale. E.g., Commonwealth v. Smart, 367 Pa. 476, 483,
81 A.2d 316, 319 (1951); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 102, 61 A.2d
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Virginia cases, however, have not adopted this precept.52
The Virginia Supreme Court has placed in the generalized category of
lack of jurisdiction several cases which are only tangentially related to the
traditional concepts of jurisdiction. For example, the writ was held appro-
priate for application in a case to disqualify a judge on the basis of
prejudice or pecuniary interest.53 Similarly, where a statutory time limita-
tion establishes an exclusive period in which any grant of a new trial may
be made, the writ of prohibition will be used to restrain an official from
granting a new trial after the expiration of that period."
B. Beyond the Threshold: Conditions Which Augment or Discourage
Issuance of the Writ
Some cases have conditioned the issuance of the writ upon necessity.5 5
This is not a separate ground for recovery but merely a qualification of
the threshold requirement of a lack or excess of jurisdiction. In Supervi-
sors of Bedford v. Wingfield," the Virginia Supreme Court, in setting out
the general principles of law governing writs of prohibition, said that the
writ issues only in cases of extreme necessity. The court defined "extreme
necessity" by stating: "[B]efore [the writ] can be granted, it must appear
that the party aggrieved has no remedy in the inferior tribunals." 57 Simi-
larly, other cases add to the threshold requirement for issuance of the
writ a showing of potential injury or injustice to the petitioner. For ex-
ample, in Board of Supervisors v. Bazile,9 the Virginia Supreme Court
described the writ of prohibition as an instrument "issued to restrain in-
ferior courts from acting without authority of law where damage or injus-
tice are likely to follow from such action."6
Prohibition will issue only to inferior courts, boards, officers or tribu-
nals having judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The writ will not issue
against individuals in their private character"' but will issue against them
426, 430 (1948).
52. See, e.g., Lee v. James, 212 Va. 792, 188 S.E. 2d 102 (1972); Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va.
613, 139 S.E. 2d 114 (1964); King v. Hening, 203 Va. 582, 125 S.E. 2d 827 (1962); Board at
Supervisors v. Bazile, 196 Va. 739, 80 S.E. 2d 566 (1954).
53. Ewing v. Haas, 132 Va. 215, 111 S.E. 255 (1922).
54. Burroughs v. Taylor, 90 Va. 55, 17 S.E. 745 (1893). Cf. In re Virginia Dep't of Correc-
tions, 222 Va. 454, 281 S.E. 2d 857 (1981) (time period for suspension of judgment).
55. See, e.g., Lee v. Jones, 212 Va. 792, 188 S.E.2d 102 (1972).
56. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 329 (1876). See also Board of Supervisors v. Bazile, 195 Va. 739, 80
S.E.2d 566 (1954) (the writ is necessary where ordinary remedies are insufficient).
57. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 333.
58. The writ of prohibition will prevent potential injury rather than remedy existing in-
jury. See note 7 supra.
59. 195 Va. 739, 80 S.E.2d 566 (1954).
60. Id. at 747, 80 S.E. at 572. See also King v. Hening, 203 Va. 582, 125 S.E.2d 827 (1962);
Supervisors of Bedford v. Wingfield, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 329 (1896).
61. See, e.g., Bee Hive Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Va. 240, 132 S.E. 177 (1926);
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in their capacity as judges or officers of the courts or other tribunals. Any
acts which are not judicial in nature, that is, those which are merely min-
isterial, administrative or executive in character, are not subject to the
writ.2 For example, in Burch v. Hardwicke,6 3 an early Virginia case, the
court denied a writ of prohibition to restrain a town mayor from his in-
vestigation of charges against the chief of police finding that the mayor
acted not in a judicial capacity, but within his supervisory powers as the
town's chief executive officer. In Bee Hive Mining Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission," however, the court granted the writ to restrain an administra-
tive body, holding that an industrial commission acts in a judicial capac-
ity when it attempts to issue an award unauthorized by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. In the case of an administrative body, the distinction
as to what acts are judicial or quasi-judicial remains obscure.6 5
The writ or prohibition is "never allowed to usurp the functions of a
writ of error, and can never be employed as a process for the correction of
errors of inferior tribunals.66 This is especially true where the law pro-
vides that no writ of error shall lie.67 However, the fact that a writ of
error would issue, does not preclude prohibition as a form of relief. The
two may be concurrent remedies in the sense that either could provide
relief from injustice resulting from action in excess of jurisdiction." The
distinction is that the writ of prohibition issues prior to a final judgment
whereas the writ of error issues subsequent to any judgment. Thus, where
a court, by mistake, has taken jurisdiction of a matter and rendered judg-
ment, that judgment is not void nor is there an opportunity to resort to
Burch v. Hardwicke, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 51 (1873).
62. Bee Hive Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Va. 240, 132 S.E. 177 (1926).
63. 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 51 (1873).
64. 144 Va. 240, 132 S.E. 177 (1926).
65. One writer classified a wide variety of administrative activities as either judicial or
quasi-judicial for the purposes of prohibition. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 416
(1st ed. 1958). That same writer advocates the abolition of the writ's use as a means of
judicial review in the administrative law setting. K. DAvis, ADmNISTRATVE LAW TEXT §
23.14 at 436 (1959). He holds this position in spite of an ever growing need for judicial
review in the rapidly increasing field of administrative law.
66. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) at 334. The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently followed this
precept. See, e.g., Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 139 S.E.2d 114 (1964); Board of Supervisors
v. Bazile, 195 Va. 739, 80 S.E.2d 566 (1954); Grief v. Kegley, 115 Va. 552, 79 S.E. 1062
(1913); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Beale, 102 Va. 295, 46 S.E. 307 (1904); Moss v. Barham, 94
Va. 12, 26 S.E. 388 (1896). A writ of error may be distinguished from a writ of prohibition in
that in the former the superior court requires the trial court to remit the record of an action
before it in which a final judgment has been entered to examine certain alleged errors.
67. See Nelms v. Vaughan, 84 Va. 696, 5 S.E. 704 (1888). Here the legislature had set a
policy of providing a "cheap and speedy" method of contesting election results. In further-
ance thereof, the statute provided there would be no appeal on the basis of error. See also
Grief v. Kegley, 115 Va. 552, 79 S.E. 1062 (1913).
68. Board of Supervisors v. Gorrell, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 484 (1871). The court held that
where a writ of error is found inadequate, a writ of prohibition will issue.
[Vol. 16:693
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the writ of prohibition. 9
IV. PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING WRIT
"[T]he superior tribunal may interpose the aid of prohibition at any
stage of the proceedings below, even after verdict, sentence or judg-
ment. '70 It is clear, however, that there must be a proceeding pending in
the inferior court.7 1 Although the writ may be applied to arrest such pro-
ceedings, 72 it will not perform the function of an interlocutory appeal.
7 3
Because of the writ's preventive rather than remedial nature 4 it "issues
only to prevent the commission of a future act, and not to undo an act
already performed. 7 5 Where, therefore, the proceedings sought to be pro-
hibited have been disposed of by the trial court and no action by the
parties or the court can revive the cause on that level, prohibition will not
issue. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia provide that all final
judgments, orders and decrees 6 shall remain under the control of the
trial court for a period no longer than twenty-one days.77 During that
twenty-one day period the final judgment order, or decree is subject to
modification, vacation or suspension by the trial court.78 As such, still
under the control of the trial court, the writ may be granted during that
period. Thus, where the trial court has lost jurisdiction over convicted
felons after judgment by entering a final order of suspension of their
sentences and release and the passage of the twenty-one days, the writ
will not lie. However, where no final action has been taken to remove the
convicted felons fr6m the control of the trial court because of the pen-
dency of a motion to suspend, the writ will lie.
79
69. County School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956) (prohibition does not
lie to prevent subordinate court from deciding erroneously or from enforcing erroneous
judgment in case in which it had right to adjudicate).
70. Prohibition (Writ of), 26 Va. Rep. Ann. 524 (monograph following Jackson v. Max-
well, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 636 (1826). Accord, French v. Noel, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 454 (1872).
71. See Goodrich v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 295, 171 S.E.2d 256 (1969) (writ denied
where no proceeding had been instituted against the petitioner).
72. See French v. Noel, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 454 (1872); Mayo v. James, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.)
17.
73. Williams v. Maxwell, 396 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1968).
74. See note 7 supra.
75. J. HIMGH, supra note 2, at 552. See also United States v. Hoffman, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
158 (1867); Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 139 S.E.2d 114 (1964). But cf. James v. Stokes, 77
Va. 225 (1883) (though judgments actually rendered, executions levied and the money in the
hands of constable, writ will still lie).
76. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief contem-
plated, provides with reasonable completeness for giving effect to the sentence, and leaves
nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the order.
Daniels v. Truck & Equip. Corp., 205 Va. 579, 139 S.E.2d 31 (1964).
77. R. Sup. CT. VA. 1:1.
78. Id.
79. In re Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 222 Va. 454, 281 S.E.2d 857 (1981) (involving five
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As a general rule, the burden is placed upon the petitioner to make,
prior to application for the writ, some plea or objection at the trial court
level regarding that court's lack of jurisdiction. 0 Although the Virginia
Supreme Court has adopted this requirement, it notes that the rule is not
rigid or arbitrary."' As noted, the underlying principle of this rule is re-
spect and courtesy to the inferior court.82 However, this principle may
yield where there is a great need for judicial expediency in avoiding un-
necessary litigation on the merits.83 This is particularly true where the
case involves substantial rights of the litigants or matters of public inter-
est and convenience.8 4
Subsequent to an unsuccessful objection to the jurisdiction in the lower
court, unless exempted from this requirement on the basis of judicial ex-
pediency, application may be made to a superior court 5 for the writ of
prohibition. In Virginia, the procedure for granting the writ is regulated
entirely by statute.8 ' Application may be made by any party to the pro-
ceeding below who is likely to be injuriously 8 7 affected by that court's
action without jurisdiction. The proper petition for the writ is one which
states plainly and clearly the grounds for the relief of prohibition. 9 Such
petition must be verified by oath after the adverse party has been served
with a copy and reasonable notice of the intended application.9 0 Under
the rule to show cause requirement, now eliminated in Virginia, the ad-
verse party had to appear before the court to deny the allegations made
in the petition. The present notice requirement has substituted for the
convicted felons, three of whom had been released after sentences were suspended and two
others on whose convictions motions to suspend were still pending). See also Burroughs v.
Taylor, 90 Va. 55, 17 S.E. 745 (1893).
80. See King v. Hening, 203 Va. 582, 125 S.E.2d 827 (1962). For an interesting look at this
plea to jurisdiction requirement, see Commonwealth v. Latham, 85 Va. 632, 8 S.E. 488
(1889) (majority held no plea necessary hinting that even if it were necessary, motion to
transfer would meet requirement).
81. 195 Va. 739, 80 S.E.2d 566.
82. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
83. 203 Va. 582, 125 S.E.2d 827.
84. Id. (public interest required speedy determination of jurisdictional issue in this an-
nexation suit).
85. In Virginia, the proper venue for the writ is the circuit court of the county wherein
the record or proceeding is to which the writ relates. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-261 (Cum. Supp.
1981). A writ from the Virginia Supreme Court shall issue and be tried at any place of
session of the court. Id. § 17-98 (RepI. Vol. 1975).
86. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-644 to -652 (Repl. Vol. 1977); M. BURKS, VIRGINIA PLEADNG
AND PRACTICE § 200 (4th ed. 1952).
87. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
88. One Virginia case recognized an exception to the universal rule that the writ is issued
only at the instance of the party aggrieved. The court, relying on the English history of the
writ, stated that prohibition may be issued at the instance of a mere stranger. 53 Va. (12
Gratt.) 17. See generally Hughes & Brown, supra note 3.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-645 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
90. Id. § 8.01-644.
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rule to show cause. Thus, where the defendant fails to appear, or appear-
ing fails to make a defense, a preemptory writ shall be awarded.9 1 Al-
though there are no Virginia cases dealing with defenses, the Code pro-
vides for their use.9 2 In the interest of judicial economy, the statutes
permit a superior court to make an order suspending the proceedings be-
low until the final decision of the prohibition action.9 3 Upon issuance of
the writ, obedience may be enforced by process of contempt.
9 4
V. CONCLUSION,
The use of the writ of prohibition in Virginia is likely to remain spo-
radic as long as the courts strongly adhere to the rule demanding a lack of
jurisdiction as the prerequisite to the writ's issuance. The recent Virginia
Supreme Court cases do not reflect any trend toward relaxation of this
requirement. Yet, as this analysis of the writ has shown, the writ remains
viable and may be the answer for an otherwise remediless client. An
awareness of the issues surrounding the writ and the procedural guidelies
involved may help the legal practitioner to utilize the writ and thus avoid
potential injustice to litigants.
David W. Clarke
91. Id. 9 8.01-646.
92. Id. 9 8.01-647.
93. Id. §§ 8.01-650, 651.
94. Id. 9 8.01-652.
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